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We provide economy-wide modeling results of the national and regional implications of two 
current challenges facing the Australian wine industry: a decline in export demand for 
premium wines, and a possible change in the tax on domestic wine sales following the Henry 
Review of Taxation. The demand shock causes regional GDP to fall in the cool and warm 
wine regions but not in the hot wine regions unless the shock is large. A change from the 
current ad valorem tax to a similarly low volumetric tax on domestic wine sales causes 
regional GDP to rise in the cool and warm wine regions, partly offsetting its fall due to the 
export demand shock; but GDP in the hot wine regions would fall substantially. The switch to 
a volumetric tax as high as the standard beer rate would raise tax revenue and lower domestic 
wine consumption by more than one-third, but would induce a one-third decrease in 
production of non-premium wine as its consumer price would rise by at least three-quarters 
(while the average price of super premium wines would change very little), hence 
exacerbating the difference in effects of a tax reform on hot versus warm and cool wine 
regions’ GDP.   
 
Keywords: Wine export demand, wine consumer taxation, regional economy-wide modeling  
 




Wine export demand shocks and wine tax reform in Australia: 






The Australian wine industry has been facing a number of challenges of late. Some of 
them are weather-related (bushfires, extreme heatwaves, drought and associated 
unavailability of adequate water, excessive rain or frost in some areas). Some are due to 
the rapid expansion in Australia’s vineyard plantings in the past 15 years, followed by 
similarly rapid expansions in other New World wine-exporting countries. But two other 
challenges are the focus of this paper. One is the current decline in export demand for 
premium wines, in part due to the financial crisis in the United States and the consequent 
recession there and in many economies. The other is the prospect of a change in the 
consumer tax on domestic wine sales, once the Henry Review of Taxation in Australia is 
completed in 2010.
1
The reason for considering these two challenges together is because the export 
demand shock has occurred since the databases of existing models of the Australian 
economy were prepared. Its effects thus need to be simulated first, as a way of re-basing 
such models, before exploring the effects of any tax changes that may take place after 
mid-2010. Also, one set of proposed consumer tax changes – from the current ad valorem 
tax to a volumetric wine tax – would lead to a fall in domestic sales of non-premium 
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wines but possibly an increase in sales of more-expensive wines, depending in part on the 
extent to which the tax reform also involved raising the wine tax rate in order to bring it 
closer to the rates applying to other beverages on a volume-of-alcohol basis.
2 Meanwhile, 
a decline in demand for exports of premium wine could have the opposite effects. Given 
that the hot winegrape-growing regions of Australia produce most of Australia’s non-
premium wine while the cool regions specialize in producing super premium wine (with 
warm regions having more of a mix of both plus commercial premium wines), these 
challenges have profoundly differing implications for the various regional economies in 
Australia, hence the focus of the present study on the regional dimension. 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we explain the regional 
economy-wide modeling approach used. We then present the results from four 
simulations: two alternative export demand shocks (one more negative than the other), 
followed by two alternative tax reforms that change the current ad valorem wine tax of 29 
percent to a volumetric tax (one that brings the new wine tax up to the rate applying to 
beer of less than 3 percent alcohol, the other to the higher rate applying to standard-
strength beer). The final section draws together the implications of the findings. 
 
 
II. THE MODELING APPROACH 
 
 
The approach to be taken in this analysis is to use an economy-wide model of the 
Australian economy that is capable both of distinguishing between the three types of  
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wine just mentioned (non-premium, commercial premium and super premium) and of 
showing the impacts at a disaggregated regional level. For that purpose we use the 
ORANIG model (see www.monash.edu.au/policy/oranig.htm), which has been modified 
to generate what we call the ORANIG06-WINE model, which is based on 2006 data for 
the Australian economy. The national economy has been disaggregated into 36 regions, 
all but six of which are wine-intensive regions. While this model is regional only in a top-
down manner, it is appropriate for analysing an external demand shock and a national 
policy issue such as a change in national alcohol taxes, because in both cases it is 
defensible to assume that wine prices would change across all regions by the same 
proportion for each of the three wine types.
3  The advantage of modifying ORANIG for 
analyzing a change in the national tax on wine consumption is that it is relatively 
straightforward to make the desirable disaggregation of alcoholic beverages into 
numerous sectors with a top-down specification.
4  
ORANIG has been modified to create ORANIG06-WINE as follows: 
•  The published 2001-02 national input-output database has a single wine, spirits 
and tobacco sector and a single beer sector. The former is split into three types of 
wine (non-premium, commercial premium and super premium), plus spirits and 
tobacco, and the beer sector is split into non-premium and premium types. A new 
ready-to-drink sector, RTDs, is created partly from spirits and partly from the soft 
drinks sector.  
•  The database is updated to 2005-06 to reflect available national accounts and 
international trade data, using the ADJUST procedure devised by Mark Horridge 
(see www.monash.edu.au/policy/archivep.htm TPMH0058). Value added data in  
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the model’s 2005-06 three wine sub-sectors and its grape sector in each wine 
region and climate zone are summarized in Appendix Table 1, the shares of gross 
value of wine production from the three sub-sectors are shown for each region in 
Appendix Table 2, and the model’s structure of costs in wine production that year 
are summarized in Appendix Table 3.
5  
•  The model also includes a top-down regional module that separates out all the 
significant wine regions of Australia (Appendix Table 1 and Appendix Figure 1). 
The wine regions are also classified into three climatic zones: cool, warm, and 
hot. In 2005-06, one-tenth of the value added in grape production came from cool 
regions, two-thirds from warm regions and not quite one-quarter from hot regions 
as defined (bottom of Appendix Table 1, based on the regional classifications 
shown in the final column).
6 
•  Indirect taxes on both household consumption and intermediate inputs are split 
into three: GST, ad valorem top-up taxes, and volumetric taxes. Given the 
significance of on-premise alcohol consumption, this allows us to account for on-
premise taxes in the hotels and restaurants sector. The significance of this is that, 
as on-premise markups typically exceed 100 percent, we do not overestimate the 
impacts of particular tax scenarios which would arise from treating all alcohol 
consumption as if purchases were at off-premise prices. The tax revenue raised 
from alcohol consumption taxes, according to the model’s 2005-06 database, is 
summarized in Appendix Table 4. 
•  ORANIG06-WINE also contains a small fiscal module, so as to allow for direct 
taxation. The significance of this modification is that we wish to ensure that the  
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overall government budget balance is unchanged. In the event that a wine tax 
policy change is not budget-neutral, there is an accommodating direct tax rate 
shift to maintain overall fiscal budget neutrality. 
 
Models in the ORANI family (Dixon et al. 1982) usually have a linear 
expenditure system (LES) of household demand. The advantage of LES in an economy-
wide model is that it models expenditure and price effects with relatively few parameters 
(n parameters in a system of n commodities). The disadvantage is that there are no 
specific cross-price effects, with cross-price elasticities being determined by expenditure 
effects alone. This system is satisfactory for relatively broad groups of commodities, as 
are usually found in published input-output tables, but it is undesirable in the context of 
finely disaggregated commodities that are potentially substitutable, and particularly in a 
policy scenario in which there is the assumption of such substitution, as in the present 
case of a wine tax switch. LES is unsatisfactory because a revenue-neutral tax switch is 
likely to entail negligible expenditure effects and significant price effects; hence a 
modification that allows for price substitution, even if at the expense of commodity-
specific expenditure elasticities, is appropriate. We modified household demands 
accordingly, by grouping alcohol consumption into three nests, namely beer, wine, and 
spirits/RTDs. Each of the three has an expenditure elasticity (or marginal budget share) 
within the LES. Household demand for beer is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
nest of two beer types, while wine consumption is a CES nest of three types. Finally, 
spirits and RTDs form a CES nest that is part of the LES. We do not allow for cross-price 
effects between, for example, non-premium wine and beer types.
7 However, we include  
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below a sensitivity analysis section in which we explore the effects on our results of 
altering the CES between the three wine types from the default value of 2.0 to either 0.5 
or 4.0. 
   
 
III. APPLYING THE MODEL: ESTIMATING EFFECTS OF EXPORT DEMAND 
AND TAX REFORM SHOCKS 
 
 
Four sets of simulation results are reported in this section: two alternative export demand 
shocks (one more negative than the other), followed by two alternative tax reforms that 
change the current ad valorem wine tax of 29 percent to a volumetric tax (one that brings 
the new wine tax up to the rate applying to light-strength beer, the other to the higher rate 
applying to standard-strength beer).  
The first export demand shock assumes there is a 20 percent decline in super 
premium wine export demand coupled with a 10 percent rise in commercial premium 
wine export demand (both measured in value terms), and no change in non-premium 
demand. As of early 2009, that seemed a reasonable characterization of the type of shock 
the industry would face in 2009-10. By mid-2009, however, it was clear that the shock 
was going to be more severe, with demand for commercial premium wine falling even 
more than that for super premium and with total export sales falling by about $650 
million from the 2006 level. Specifically, the second export demand shock assumes there 
is a 10 percent decline in super premium wine export demand – less severe than initially  
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feared – but with a 33 percent decline in commercial premium wine export demand (and 
again no change in non-premium demand).  
Once that second shock to the model’s database is in place, follow-on changes 
from the current ad valorem domestic wine consumption tax of 29 percent to a volumetric 
tax are explored. The first tax simulation raises the wine tax to the rate applying to beer 
with less than 3 percent alcohol (A$28 per litre of alcohol), and the second tax simulation 
raises the wine tax to the rate applying to beer with more than 3 percent alcohol (A$40.82 
per litre of alcohol). To make it easy to compare results across the simulations, the effects 
of each of the two tax scenarios are presented as additional to the effects of the second 
export demand shock. 
 
A change in demand for Australian wine exports 
 
With the recession in high-income countries from 2008, demand for Australian super 
premium wine exports has shrunk, as consumers eat out less and tighten their spending. 
Substitution to lower-quality premium wines has been occurring, and initially it was 
thought that this would result in an increase in commercial premium demand. To simulate 
that shock, we assume in our first scenario that, relative to 2005-06, there is a 20 percent 
reduction in export demand for Australia’s super premium wine but a 10 percent increase 
in export demand for commercial premium wine. The estimated macroeconomic effects 
of this shock, shown in column 1 of Table 1, reveal that this involves a slight decline in 
Australia’s overall exports and imports, real GDP and real household income. In the 
second and more-severe export demand shock, involving just a 10 percent reduction in  
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export demand for Australia’s super premium wine but a 33 percent decline in export 
demand for commercial premium wine, shown in column 2 of Table 1, those declines are 
somewhat greater but still small. 
With the first demand shock, regional GDP falls in the cool and warm wine 
regions (by 0.1 and 0.2 percent, respectively) but rises in the hot wine regions (by 0.2 
percent), as shown at the bottom of column 1 of Table 2. This is mostly because, as 
shown at the bottom of column 1 of Table 3, the volume of wine production falls in the 
cool and warm wine regions (by 5.7 and 2.5 percent, respectively) but rises in the hot 
wine regions (by 1.9 percent). With the more-severe export demand shock, by contrast, 
regional GDP falls in all three climate zones because wine production falls not only in the 
cool and warm regions but also in the hot wine regions, by 6.1, 8.5 and 9.0 percent, 
respectively (bottom of column 2 of Tables 2 and 3, with impacts for specific wine 
regions shown in the bulk of those tables). 
The aggregate national decline in wine production with the first demand shock is 
1.6 percent. This is made up of a fall in super premium wine output of 8.3 percent and a 
rise of 5.5 percent for commercial premium (and no significant change for non-premium) 
wine, while the gross value of grapes in aggregate would fall nationally by just 0.5 
percent (column 1 of Table 4). By contrast, the aggregate national decline in the gross 
value of wine production with the second, more-severe export demand shock is 8.4 
percent, with super premium wine falling just 3.7 percent but commercial premium wine 
production falling 17 percent (and again no significant change for non-premium wine). In 
that second case, grape production falls nationally by almost 5 percent (column 2 of 




A switch from an ad valorem to a volumetric domestic wine consumption tax 
 
What if, on top of the more-severe export demand shock, there was a change from the 
current ad valorem tax on domestic wholesale wine sales of 29 percent to a volumetric 
tax equal to that applied to beer in Australia?
8 We simulate that tax shock first at the low-
alcohol beer rate of A$28 per litre of alcohol and then at the standard beer rate of 
A$40.82. The motivation for taxing alcohol is to address negative 
externalities associated with consumption. Studies assessing externalities 
by alcohol type include Zhao xxx [full citation to follow], who found that 
the incidence of binge drinking was highest for RTDs and full-strength 
beer and lowest for bottled wine. 
Either tax change would further reduce, albeit slightly, Australian aggregate 
exports and imports (Table 1). In the hot wine regions the extra tax would lower regional 
GDP, while in the warm and cool regions the tax change would cause regional GDP to 
rise slightly, nearly offsetting the negative effects there of even the larger of export 
demand shock (Table 2). This is because wine production rises in the cool and warm 
wine regions (by about 9 and 0.5 percent, respectively) but falls in the hot wine regions 
(by 19 percent) following either of the two tax reforms (see bottom three rows of 
columns 3 and 4 Table 3). When combined with the export shock, this leads to declines 
of 8 and 10 percent for the warm and hot wine regions, respectively, but a net increase in 
cool-climate wine production of 2.8 percent. 
The aggregate national change in wine production following the switch from ad 
valorem to volumetric taxation of wine consumers is small (0.2 percent if the lower  
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volumetric tax applies, -1.9 of the higher one applies), but the compositional changes are 
large:  super premium wine output rises 15 percent but commercial premium output falls 
between 8 and 13 percent and the output of non-premium wine falls by almost one-third 
(columns 3 and 4 of Table 4). When combined with the export shock, the larger tax 
change would result in changes of 11, -31 and -33 percent for super premium, 
commercial premium and non-premium wine production, respectively. That amounts to a 
decline in aggregate national wine production of just over 10 percent. 
The large non-premium change in response to the switch to a high volumetric tax 
is not surprising, given that half of domestic wine sales are non-premium and their 
consumer price would rise by at least three-quarters. The impact of those tax changes on 
the volume of domestic consumption of non-premium wine are thus even larger: it falls 
by 60-65 percent, or nearly three times as much as the decline in domestic sales of 
commercial premium wine (whose consumer price would rise by 22 or 33 percent). By 
contrast, the average price of super premium wine would change very little (-3 or 2 
percent), but the quantity consumed would rise (by about one-quarter) because the tax 
change would make it relatively cheaper vis-a-vis lower-quality wines. In aggregate, the 
retail price of wine to domestic consumers would be roughly 50 percent higher and the 
aggregate volume of wine consumed domestically would be just over one-third lower 
(Table 5).  
 




In addition to depending on the data that go into the model, these results also depend on 
numerous parameters. They are particularly sensitive to the assumed elasticity of 
substitution in consumption between the three wine types. The default elasticity is 2.0, 
causing total alcohol tax revenue to rise by about $535 million per year when the 
volumetric tax is set at the light beer rate, or by $910 million if it were to be set at the 
standard beer rate of $40.82 per litre of alcohol rather than at the current 29 percent ad 
valorem rate. But if that elasticity is instead 0.5 (or 4.0), Table 6 suggests that the rise in 
alcohol tax revenue is about one-third more (or more than one-third less).  
That elasticity assumption makes little difference to the change in aggregate 
domestic volume of wine consumption and hence to the change in wine output, but it 
makes big differences to the composition of both: Table 7(a) shows that instead of falling 
33 percent, non-premium wine output would fall 14 percent (45 percent) if the elasticity 
was 0.5 (4.0), while instead of rising 15 percent, super premium wine output would rise 1 
percent (28 percent) if the elasticity was 0.5 (4.0). This is because the volume of domestic 
consumption of non-premium wine would fall 27 percent (88 percent) if the elasticity 
was 0.5 (4.0) instead of 65 percent in the default case, while instead of rising 26 percent, 
super premium wine consumption volume would rise 1 percent (52 percent) if the 
elasticity was 0.5 (4.0), as shown in Table 7(b).  
One final caveat. Throughout we have ignored the fact that in recent years the 
government has provided a rebate of the Wine Equalization Tax to those wineries with 
annual domestic sales below $1.72 million. That rebate amounted to around $110 million 
in 2006, the model’s base year, and to about twice that in subsequent years because New 
Zealand wineries have also qualified for the rebate on their sales in the Australian market  
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(under the Closer Economic Relations agreement between the two countries). Had that 
rebate been incorporated in the baseline, and were it to be discontinued under a 
volumetric tax scheme, the benefits estimated above from such a tax change for super 
premium producers and cool climate regions would be less and may even be negative for 






As is clear from the caveats in the previous section, the above results are very much 
dependent on both model parameters and the less-than-perfect data available on wine 
taxes net of rebates and prices and quantities of the three different types of wines and 
associated grapes produced in the various wine regions of Australia. For example, the 
lower the degree of substitutability between different wine types, the less effective would 
be a switch from ad valorem to volumetric taxing of domestic wine consumption aimed at 
discouraging binge consumption of non-premium wine; and the higher the WET rebate 
for smaller growers, the less likely it is that they (and possibly consumers of their super 
premium wines) would gain from a switch to volumetric wine taxation. Better data would 
allow better analysis both directly and also through improving the opportunities for 
econometricians to improve available estimates of crucial parameters such as the 
elasticity of substitution in consumption.  
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  Meanwhile, the results from the above analysis reveal that both the decline in 
demand abroad for Australian wine and a prospective change in taxation of domestic 
wine consumption add non-trivially to the industry’s current challenges of disposing of 
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1 The Henry Review comes a decade after the introduction in Australia of a 10 percent goods-and-services 
tax (GST), at which time the excise tax on wine was replaced by not only the GST at the retail level but 
also a Wine Equalization Tax (WET) at the wholesale level. The WET was so called because, by setting it 
at 29 percent, it together with the GST generated about the same tax revenue for the government as the 
former excise tax on wine. For an analysis of the impact of that tax reform of a decade ago on the 
Australian wine industry, see Wittwer and Anderson (2002).  
2 If the 29 percent ad valorem wholesale tax on wine were to be replaced by the excise tax applying to 
standard-strength beer (A$0.82 per litre of alcohol), then wines retailing above about A$18 per 750 ml 
bottle would potentially be cheaper, assuming a retail mark-up margin of one-third the wholesale price. 
3 Even in the ORANIG model some industries are designated as "local". These include Utilities, 
Construction, Trade, Transport, BankFinIns, OwnerDwellng and PersOthSrv. In these sectors, regional 
output changes follow changes in regional income, which captures regional multiplier impacts, so output 
changes will differ across regions for these industries. 
4 By contrast, modifying a multi-region bottom-up model such as the TERM model of the Australian 
economy (www.monash.edu.au/policy/term.htm) would require more complicated coding and large 
amounts of detailed regional data.  
5 The data available to split each region’s wine output and value added into three quality categories are very 
limited. Better data are available on the distribution of winegrape prices (see AWBC 2009), but they are 
only an approximate guide because grapes are often transported after harvest to another region for 
processing. Anderson et al. (2009) divide the 2008 crush into 3 quality categories by assuming grapes 
valued at less than A$550 per tonne were non-premium and those above A$1200 were super premium.  
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Those dividers suggest nearly one-third of the crush volume and one-sixth of the crush value was non-
premium that year, while one-sixth of the crush volume and a little over one-third of the crush value was 
super premium, hence around half was commercial premium winegrapes (Anderson et al. 2009, Tables 20-
21). Based on similar regional winegrape price and quantity data for 2006 and information about inter-
regional grape movements, we have allocated a distribution across the three wine types for each region. 
Those guesses imply that, as shown in Appendix Tables 1 and 2, a bit over one-third in value terms is 
commercial premium and one-half is super premium. Since these are close to the opposite of the winegrape 
value shares adopted by Anderson et al. (2009), the implicit dividing line used here between the 
commercial and super premium categories is at a slightly lower quality level.   
6 We use the same criteria as Anderson et al. (2009) in categorizing regions into climate zones, as follows. 
Hot zone: mean January and February temperatures each above 23
oC and Growing Degree Days above 
2200; Cool zone: mean January and February temperatures each below 20
oC and Growing Degree Days 
below 1550. The data for those variables by region have been carefully compiled by Webb (2006, pp. 239-
240 and Section 2.1). 
7 The extent to which preference independence applies for different types of alcohol may be matter of 
debate. We could have chosen ostensibly more elaborate demand forms, such as a translog system (Dixon 
et al. 1992) or CRESH (Hanoch 1971). Each of these forms allows for different pairwise elasticities of 
substitution, although the restrictions of each system may erode their intuitive appeal. That is, target cross-
price elasticities between alcohol types regarded as close substitutes may be confounded by the adding-up 
conditions of the system. 
8 A key motivation for taxing alcohol, in addition to raising government revenue, is to address negative 
externalities associated with consumption. Studies assessing externalities by alcohol type, including by 
Srivastava and Zhao (2008), find that the incidence of binge drinking is highest for consumers of ready-to-
drink spirits-based sweet beverages (RTDs) and full-strength beer, and are lowest for bottled wine and light 
beer. This is the rationale behind our chosen scenarios.  
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10 percent rise 
in commercial 
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Changes to wine 
export demand: 
10 percent 
decline in super 
premium wine 















wine tax at the 





Real household income  -0.006  -0.03  -0.04  -0.05 
Real investment  0.001  0.00  -0.00  0.00 
Real govt spending  0.000  0.00  0.00     0.00 
Export volume  -0.047  -0.27  -0.02  -0.02 
Import volume  -0.048  -0.28  -0.01  -0.01 
Real GDP  -0.003  -0.01  -0.02  -0.03 
Aggregate employment  0.000  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Average real wage  0.001  0.01  -0.15  -0.24 
Aggregate capital stock  -0.002  -0.01  -0.00  0.00 
GDP Price Index  -0.005  -0.03  0.08  0.12 
Consumer Price Index  -0.004  -0.02  0.14  0.22 
Export Price Index  -0.004  -0.02  0.00  0.01 
Real devaluation  0.005  0.03  -0.08  -0.12 
 
Source: Authors’ model simulation results 
 
a LAL = litres of alcohol. The tax simulations use as their base the resulting data after the 
export demand shock of a 10 percent decline in super premium wine coupled with a 33 
percent decline in commercial premium. That is, they are the additional effects due to just 
the tax change.  
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Table 2: Simulation results: effects on regional GDP, all sectors  
(percent change) 
 
Changes to wine 
export demand: 20 
percent decline in 
super premium and 
10 percent rise in 
commercial premium 
Changes to wine export 
demand: 10 percent 
decline in super 
premium wine and 33 




wine tax at the 






wine tax at the 




RoNSW  0.01  0.03  -0.013  -0.01 
NwcstlNSW  0.02  0.02  -0.007  -0.01 
HunterBalNSW  0.02  -0.05  -0.016  -0.03 
CentTbleNSW  0.05  -0.03  -0.073  -0.09 
OrangeNSW  0.01  0.00  0.010  0.01 
STblelndNSW  0.00  -0.05  -0.017  -0.02 
LMrmbNSW  0.20  -0.76  -2.601  -2.89 
MrryDrlngNSW  0.26  -1.34  -1.086  -1.31 
RoVIC  0.00  -0.01  -0.004  0.00 
YarraRngVic  -0.11  0.03  0.212  0.23 
MorningtnVic  -0.05  0.03  0.113  0.13 
WCentrlHLVic  -0.07  -0.53  0.129  0.09 
WOvnsMrryVic  -0.10  -0.78  -0.274  -0.36 
EOvensMurVic  -0.02  -0.19  -0.064  -0.09 
SWGoulbuVic  0.00  -0.05  -0.052  -0.06 
WstMalleeVIC  0.04  -0.17  -0.131  -0.15 
EMalleeVic  0.04  -0.37  -0.194  -0.24 
DrlngDwnsQld  0.00  -0.02  -0.012  -0.02 
RoQLD  0.01  0.05  -0.007  -0.01 
RoSA  -0.04  -0.26  0.004  0.00 
SAdelaideSA  -0.10  -0.11  0.176  0.18 
BarossaSA  -0.94  -2.27  1.511  1.47 
MtLoftRanSA  -0.19  -0.19  0.316  0.33 
FleurieuSA  0.00  -0.66  -0.004  -0.06 
LwrNthSA  -0.29  -0.83  0.455  0.43 
RiverLndSA  0.54  -2.14  -1.523  -1.89 
UpperSESA  -0.09  -0.65  0.091  0.04 
LowerSESA  -0.16  -0.19  0.162  0.15 
NMetroWA  0.01  0.04  0.002  0.01 
RoWA  0.01  0.06  -0.007  -0.01 
VasseWA  -0.75  -0.82  1.223  1.27 
KingWA  -0.18  -0.44  0.294  0.29 
TAS  -0.02  0.04  0.052  0.06 
NT/ACT  0.00  0.01  0.001  0.00 
TOTAL, Australia  -0.00  -0.01  -0.077  -0.12 
WINE CLIMATIC ZONES 
Hot  0.2  -1.0  -1.4  -1.7 
Warm  -0.2  -0.5  0.3  0.3 
Cool  -0.1  -0.1  0.1  0.1 
Source: Authors’ model simulation results 
a LAL = litres of alcohol. The tax simulations use as their base the resulting data after the export demand 
shock of a 10 percent decline in super premium wine coupled with a 33 percent decline in commercial 
premium. That is, they are the additional effects due to just the tax change.  
18 
 
Table 3: Simulation results: effects on regional volume of wine production  
(percent) 
 
Changes to wine 
export demand: 20 
percent decline in 
super premium and 10 
percent rise in 
commercial premium 
Changes to wine export 
demand: 10 percent 
decline in super 
premium wine and 33 




wine tax at the 





wine tax at the 
beer rate of 
A$40.82/LAL
a 
RoNSW  -1.3  -8.2  -4.2  -6.6 
NwcstlNSW  -0.1  -11.0  -1.2  -4.1 
HunterBalNSW  -0.1  -11.0  -1.2  -4.1 
CentTbleNSW  4.9  -15.3  -11.0  -15.7 
OrangeNSW  -1.4  -10.4  2.8  0.3 
STblelndNSW  -1.3  -8.2  -4.2  -6.6 
LMrmbNSW  1.5  -4.7  -25.0  -28.0 
MrryDrlngNSW  3.8  -11.9  -15.6  -19.8 
RoVIC  -1.7  -9.3  0.8  -1.5 
YarraRngVic  -7.4  -4.5  12.9  12.9 
MorningtnVic  -7.6  -4.4  13.5  13.5 
WCentrlHLVic  -1.6  -10.3  3.2  0.8 
WOvnsMrryVic  -1.3  -8.2  -4.2  -6.6 
EOvensMurVic  -1.3  -8.2  -4.2  -6.6 
SWGoulbuVic  -1.3  -8.2  -4.2  -6.6 
WstMalleeVIC  3.8  -11.9  -15.6  -19.8 
EMalleeVic  3.8  -11.9  -15.6  -19.8 
DrlngDwnsQld  -1.3  -8.2  -4.2  -6.6 
RoQLD  -1.3  -8.2  -4.2  -6.6 
RoSA  -1.5  -10.4  3.1  0.6 
SAdelaideSA  -5.0  -6.8  8.8  7.8 
BarossaSA  -3.8  -8.1  6.7  5.2 
MtLoftRanSA  -6.4  -5.5  11.2  10.8 
FleurieuSA  0.0  -11.7  0.5  -2.5 
LwrNthSA  -3.4  -8.5  6.4  4.7 
RiverLndSA  4.4  -13.8  -13.0  -17.5 
UpperSESA  -1.6  -9.9  1.9  -0.5 
LowerSESA  -5.5  -6.4  9.6  8.7 
NMetroWA  -1.5  -10.4  3.1  0.6 
RoWA  -1.3  -8.2  -4.2  -6.6 
VasseWA  -6.3  -5.7  11.2  10.6 
KingWA  -3.8  -8.1  7.1  5.6 
TAS  -8.2  -3.8  14.6  14.8 
NT/ACT  -1.2  -8.2  -4.2  -6.6 
TOTAL, Australia  -1.6  -8.4  0.2  -1.9 
WINE CLIMATIC ZONES 
Hot  1.9  -9.0  -18.8  -18.9 
Warm  -2.5  -8.5  0.5  0.4 
Cool  -5.7  -6.1  8.9  8.9 
Source: Authors’ model simulation results  
a LAL = litres of alcohol. The tax simulations use as their base the resulting data after the export demand 
shock of a 10 percent decline in super premium wine coupled with a 33 percent decline in commercial 
premium. That is, they are the additional effects due to just the tax change. 
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Changes to wine 
export demand: 20 
percent decline in 
super premium 
and 10 percent rise 
in commercial 
premium 
Changes to wine 
export demand: 10 
percent decline in 
super premium wine 






wine tax at the 













Grapes  -0.5  -4.6  0.2  -0.2 
Wine:         
  non-premium  0.0  0.1  -31.0  -33.2 
  commercial premium  5.5  -17.3  -8.3  -13.4 
  super premium  -8.3  -3.7  14.7  15.0 
  TOTAL Wine   -1.6  -8.4  0.2  -1.9 
 
Source: Authors’ model simulation results 
 
a LAL = litres of alcohol. The tax simulations use as their base the resulting data after the 
export demand shock of a 10 percent decline in super premium wine coupled with a 33 
percent decline in commercial premium. That is, they are the additional effects due to just 






Table 5: Effects of wine tax changes on the volume and price of household 





Switch to volumetric wine 




Switch to volumetric 





volume  price  volume  price 
         
Non-Premium  -60  73  -65  92 
Commercial-Premium  -21  22  -26  33 
Super-Premium  25  -3  26  2 
Total Wine  -34  44  -38  58 
 
Source: Authors’ model simulation results 
 
a LAL = litres of alcohol. The tax simulations use as their base the resulting data after the 
export demand shock of a 10 percent decline in super premium wine coupled with a 33 
percent decline in commercial premium. That is, they are the additional effects due to just 
the tax change.  
21 
 
Table 6: Sensitivity analysis of effects on alcohol tax revenue of a switch to a 






(a) volumetric wine tax at the light beer rate of A$28/LAL
a 
 
  Wine CES = 0.5 
Wine CES = 2.0 
[default value]  Wine CES = 4.0 
Beer  -1  -1  -1 
Spirits  -1  -1  -1 
Wine  787  537  314 





(b) volumetric wine tax at the standard beer rate of A$40.82/LAL
a 
 
  Wine CES = 0.5 
Wine CES = 2.0 
[default value]  Wine CES = 4.0 
Beer  -1  -1  -1 
Spirits  -2  -2  -1 
Wine  1233  912  637 
Total tax  1230  909  635 
 
 
Source: Authors’ model simulation results 
 
a Showing sensitivity to change in the elasticity of substitution in consumption between 







Table 7: Sensitivity analysis of effects on the volumes of sectoral outputs and 






(a) Sectoral output volume 
 
  Wine CES = 0.5 
Wine CES = 2.0 
[default value]  Wine CES = 4.0 
RTDs  -0.15  -0.08  -0.03 
Beer premium  -0.05  -0.05  -0.04 
Beer non-Premium  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05 
Spirits  -0.20  -0.18  -0.18 
Grapes  -1.2  -0.16  0.45 
Wine non-premium  -13.66  -33.2  -45.11 
Wine comm premium  -4.79  -13.4  -20.46 
Wine super premium  0.65  15.0  28.40 






(b) Volume of domestic wine consumption 
 
  Wine CES = 0.5 
Wine CES = 2.0 
[default value]  Wine CES = 4.0 
Non-Premium  -27  -65  -88 
Commercial-Premium  -12  -26  -48 
Super-Premium  1  26  52 
Total Wine  -7.2  -4.0  -1.5 
 
 
Source: Authors’ model simulation results 
 
a Showing sensitivity to change in the elasticity of substitution in consumption between 
wine types from the default value of 2.0.    LAL = litres of alcohol.  
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Appendix Table 1: Value added by grapes and wine sub-sectors, by region, 
Australia, 2005-06 
(A$million) 











RoNSW  17  24  58  75  Warm 
NwcstlNSW  5  0  25  33  Warm 
HunterBalNSW  5  0  11  14  Warm 
CentTbleNSW  2  0  4  5  Warm 
OrangeNSW  1  0  2  2  Warm 
STblelndNSW  2  1  2  3  Warm 
LMrmbNSW  16  36  42  5  Hot 
MrryDrlngNSW  11  5  5  1  Hot 
RoVIC  63  0  125  162  Warm 
YarraRngVic  7  0  11  27  Cool 
MorningtnVic  3  0  8  10  Cool 
WCentrlHLVic  2  0  7  9  Cool 
WOvnsMrryVic  6  7  16  21  Warm 
EOvensMurVic  1  1  2  3  Cool 
SWGoulbuVic  2  1  3  4  Warm 
WstMalleeVIC  3  1  1  0  Hot 
EMalleeVic  20  3  4  1  Hot 
DrlngDwnsQld  2  2  4  6  Warm 
RoQLD  7  10  24  32  Hot 
RoSA  10  13  32  41  Warm 
SAdelaideSA  23  0  76  98  Warm 
BarossaSA  25  0  60  156  Warm 
MtLoftRanSA  6  0  6  16  Cool 
FleurieuSA  10  0  9  11  Warm 
LwrNthSA  11  1  10  26  Warm 
RiverLndSA  38  30  35  5  Hot 
UpperSESA  9  0  14  18  Warm 
LowerSESA  7  0  14  18  Cool 
NMetroWA  1  2  6  7  Hot 
RoWA  16  13  31  40  Warm 
VasseWA  14  0  23  60  Warm 
KingWA  6  0  9  24  Warm 
TAS  7  0  14  18  Cool 
NT/ACT  1  1  3  4  Warm 
TOTAL, Australia  357  124  686  965   
           
WINE CLIMATIC ZONES         
Hot  95  85  111  44   
Warm  229  65  519  805   
Cool  35  1  66  106   
 
Source: Database of the ORANIG06-WINE model  
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Appendix Table 2: Shares of non-premium, commercial premium and super 













RoNSW  20  39  41  Warm 
NwcstlNSW  6  56  38  Warm 
HunterBalNSW  6  56  38  Warm 
CentTbleNSW  11  89  0  Warm 
OrangeNSW  1  50  49  Warm 
STblelndNSW  20  39  41  Warm 
LMrmbNSW  72  28  0  Hot 
MrryDrlngNSW  31  69  0  Hot 
RoVIC  8  43  49  Warm 
YarraRngVic  1  6  93  Cool 
MorningtnVic  0  5  95  Cool 
WCentrlHLVic  0  49  51  Cool 
WOvnsMrryVic  20  39  41  Warm 
EOvensMurVic  20  39  41  Cool 
SWGoulbuVic  20  39  41  Warm 
WstMalleeVIC  31  69  0  Hot 
EMalleeVic  31  69  0  Hot 
DrlngDwnsQld  20  39  41  Warm 
RoQLD  20  39  41  Hot 
RoSA  0  49  51  Warm 
SAdelaideSA  1  23  76  Warm 
BarossaSA  1  33  67  Warm 
MtLoftRanSA  1  13  86  Cool 
FleurieuSA  1  60  40  Warm 
LwrNthSA  0  35  65  Warm 
RiverLndSA  20  80  0  Hot 
UpperSESA  4  47  50  Warm 
LowerSESA  1  20  79  Cool 
NMetroWA  0  65  35  Hot 
RoWA  0  65  35  Warm 
VasseWA  0  15  85  Warm 
KingWA  0  32  68  Warm 
TAS  0  1  99  Cool 
NT/ACT  20  39  41  Warm 
TOTAL, Australia  12  37  51   
WINE CLIMATIC ZONES       
Hot  40  50  10   
Warm  7  38  55   
Cool  2  18  81   
Source: Anderson et al. (2009) and database of the ORANIG06-WINE model  
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Non-Premium  6  19  6  69  100 
Commercial-Premium  9  22  15  54  100 
Super-Premium  12  26  13  49  100 
TOTAL Wine  10  24  13  53  100 
 


















Beer  1966 
Spirits and Ready To Drinks  1775 
Wine  893
a 
Total alcohol taxes  4634
a 
 
Source: Database of the ORANIG06-WINE model 
 
a This does not exclude what was repaid to small wineries as a rebate.  
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Source: Database of the ORANIG06-WINE model 
 